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Foreword 
Paul De Grauwe (KULeuven) & Philippe Van Parijs (UCLouvain) 
 
 
One major challenge the state reform is meant to address is the steady economic divergence between Flanders 
and Wallonia. This divergence turns out to be parallelled by a divergence in the measured performance of the 
Flemish and Francophone school systems. Whether the latter divergence contributes to the former or the 
other way around, addressing the educational divergence must be part of the solution. But this demands that 
we should first understand the causes of this divergence. 
A close look at the available data reveals that the lower educational performance of the French-speaking 
community cannot be ascribed entirely, or even mainly, to the inferior economic  performance of the Walloon 
economy or to the higher proportion of children of recent foreign origin in the Brussels Region. It also suggests 
that the divergence is not a recent phenomenon that could be explained, for example, by Flanders' higher per 
capita expenditure in education. All the contributions to this volume attempt to shed light on this issue, without 
prejudices or taboos, by considering, rejecting or proposing for critical discussion alternative explanatory 
conjectures. 
The lead piece by economist Vincent Vandenberghe (Louvain) is a revised version of the background paper for 
a Re-Bel public event organized on this issue on the 3rd of June 2010. The contributions by Sergio Perelman, 
Pierre Pestieau and Daniel Santin (Liège and Madrid), by Jean Hindriks and Marijn Verschelde (Louvain and 
Gent) and by Frank Vandenbroucke (Leuven and Antwerpen) are written versions of the comments presented 
on that same occasion. The contribution by Dirk Jacobs (ULB) mobilizes some results from a report on the 
schooling of immigrant children in the two Communities in order to shed further light on the puzzling 
divergence. 
 5 
 
 
 
 
Lead Piece 
Vincent Vandenberghe 
 6 
Inter-regional educational discrepancies in 
Belgium. How to combat them? 
Vincent Vandenberghe (UCLouvain) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1. Good-quality education is crucial for individuals. The international evidence suggests that equipping youth 
with formal skills is key in putting them on a successful life and career track. But human capital and 
education are also important for nations and communities. Education is the single most critical investment 
to raise the long-run growth potential. In the global economy, the performance of education systems is the 
yardstick for success, particularly in light of the fundamental technological and demographic challenges 
that are re-shaping our economies. Moreover, in a federal context like the Belgian one, characterised by: i) 
uniform wage/price formation mechanisms, ii) a strong aversion to income inequality and, iii) generous 
welfare transfers, combatting educational discrepancies across regions should also be viewed as a way to 
secure the federation’s long-term stability. 
 
2. The evidence abounds to suggest that there is now a sizeable inter-regional educational attainment gap 
opposing the Flemish- and French-Speaking regions. International surveys, measuring educational 
attainment in a comparable way, have emphasised the relatively poor results of the French-Speaking 
Community of Belgium. The latter can also be spotted when analysing Belgian census data. The dominant 
view is that poor economic performances in several French-Speaking areas contribute to a great extent to 
this poor educational performance.  The Region of Brussels has the highest school drop-out rate (28%) of 
the country, followed by Hainaut (25%) and Liège (23%). Along this line of reasoning, reducing the inter-
regional educational gaps should primarily involve fixing the social ills associated with poverty that impair 
mostly French-Speaking children’s learning outcomes. This probably means improving (inter alia) the 
labour market outcomes of the adults in the families in which at-risk children develop, particularly in eras 
that have been severely hit by deindustrialisation (Hainaut, Liège) or have experienced massive influxes of 
(low-skilled) immigrants, like Brussels. 
 
3. But this socio-economic “deterministic” approach of educational regional divergences calls for some 
nuances. First, the calendar of the emergence of the gap does not coincide perfectly with the development 
of inter-regional or sub-regional socio-economic discrepancies. For instance, the poor results of the 
French-Speaking Community of Belgium, highly publicised since the late 1990s, have been around for a 
long time; for much longer than most analysts usually assume. The deterioration of the French-Speaking 
education system’s effectiveness relative to that of Flanders, or neighbouring countries, has its roots in a 
quite distant past; well before the 1980s (with the introduction of the “renové”) or the1990s (with the 
complete devolution of educational policy to the Communities). Inter-regional educational discrepancies 
probably started in the early 50s, and preceded the socio-economic ones, known to have emerged in the 
1970s and early 1980s. If one can reasonably argue that two-digit unemployment rates and a string of 
associated social ills in Brussels, Liège or Hainaut now hamper educational performances, there are 
reservations as to the role these factors played in the past. Second, one should also avoid overemphasizing 
the role of socio-economic discrepancies because – conditional on a certain socio-economic profile of 
pupils – French-Speaking schools systematically perform less well that the Dutch-speaking ones. In other 
words, when controlling for the (potentially important) cross-Community differences in terms of pupils’ 
socio-economic background, immigration status, attendance of a vocational track, or the pupil/teacher 
ratio, the resulting net gap across the two main linguistic Communities remains important; i.e. equivalent 
of more than a school year. 
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4. What then could explain the propensity of French-Speaking and Dutch-speaking schools to diverge so 
much in terms of performance? There is a growing consensus among economists that educational 
attainment is the quintessential joint product. It requires a strong commitment from both the demand side 
(pupils/students and their families) and the supply side (teachers, schools and public authorities). Could it 
be that Dutch-speaking individuals/families “make more efforts” and prioritize education to a greater 
extent than their French-Speaking equivalent? The issue remains open for discussion and calls for more 
research. From an historical point of view, there is no doubt that one needs to better understand the role 
that education as a vector of emancipation may have played in explaining the surge of educational 
attainment in Flanders.  
 
5. This said, more on the supply side, there is the issue of governance. Could it be that a school-governance 
quality gap developed over the past decades across the linguistic border?  The issue also remains largely 
unsettled. This said, there are many signs suggesting that the French-Speaking schools suffer from a very 
hybrid governance regime. Hybridation exists to a certain extent in Flanders and in many other places in 
the world.  But, in comparison, it has loomed larger in the French-Speaking Community, whose decision-
makers have been unable to agree on the amount of power to be granted to the central Ministry, the local 
professionals (heads of schools), and parents or pupils.  Sempiternal divergences of view have ultimately led 
to a situation where the top-down/bureaucratic control (the obligation to implement instructions coming 
from Brussels) systematically cohabits with school-based autonomy and market-driven school 
management (the necessity to attract pupils to secure resources and jobs). Our thesis is that this hybrid 
governance regime largely echoes the “school war” and the diverging preferences of the three main 
“réseaux”. Contrary to most observers, we do not believe that the existence of “réseaux” translates into 
widespread cost-inefficiency. The true cost of the “réseaux” rather stems from their role in the emergence 
of a very hybrid governance for schools and teachers. Sceptics would rightly argue that “réseaux”, and the 
underlying antagonist conceptions as to what “good” school governance means, also exist in Flanders. 
True. But in Flanders, the “réseau” syndicating free catholic-affiliated schools is (and has always been) very 
dominant; with a market share exceeding 70%.  This has perhaps contributed to limit the ravages of the 
hybrid governance disease French-Speaking pupils may suffer from. 
 
6. The rest of the text comprises three main sections.  Section 1 adopts a long-term perspective regarding 
educational performance. It tries to trace the origins of the inter-regional educational attainment gap 
opposing the Flemish- and French-Speaking regions . Section 2 assesses the various (historical and 
contemporary) factors that could explain the inter-regional performance gap, whereas Section 3 discusses 
at greater length the likely role of school governance. 
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1. The Long-term empirical evidence about inter-regional discrepancies 
1.1. PISA 2003 vs. 2006 
At the aggregate level — that of a country or a sizeable community — educational outcomes evolve very 
slowly and gradually. The comparison of PISA1 2003 and 2006 country-mean scores in maths (Figure 1.1) 
provides a quick illustration of this simple idea.  These aggregates barely changed in three years2, both in 
absolute and relative terms, despite many policy initiatives by decision-makers dissatisfied with their position in 
the PISA 2003 league table. 
   
Figure 1.1.  PISA 2003 and 2006 results - Country mean scores in Mathematics 
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Source: PISA, OECD, 2003 and 2006 
For instance, the poor results of the French-Speaking Community of Belgium highly publicised since the late 
1990s due to the availability and also the growing popularity of international surveys measuring educational 
attainment in a comparable way (TIMSS3, PIRLS4, PISA), have been around for a long time; for much longer 
than most analysts usually assume. And the deterioration of the French-Speaking education system’s 
effectiveness relative to that of Flanders or neighbouring countries has its roots in a quite distant past; well 
before the 1980s (with the introduction of the so-called “renové”) or the1990s (with the complete devolution of 
educational policy to the Communities and the adoption of a block-grant5 financing mechanism).  
1.2. Average number of years of schooling as captured by the Belgian census 
Figure 1.2, computed with Belgian census data, suggests that the gap between Flanders and the two other 
regions in terms of the educational attainment of young adults (25-29) became significant in the early 1970s.  
However, an educational attainment gap characterising those aged 25 or more reflects differences in the 
quality of education that probably opened up 15 to 20 years before, when these individuals had their first 
experience with formal education.  The tentative conclusion is that the performance gap between the Belgian 
regions started to materialise and become statistically significant probably as early as in the mid-1950s.  
 
                                                
1 The OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment. 
2 The same could be said of standard errors measuring the inequality of attainment between pupils within each country. 
3 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study.  
4 Progress in International Reading Literacy Study. Both TIMSS and PIRLS are developed and implemented under the auspices of the International 
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). 
5 In a federal system of government, a block grant is a large sum of money granted by the national government to a regional/local government with 
only general provisions as to the way it is spent. 
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Figure 1.2.  The long-run dynamics of human capital accumulation in Belgium and its regions 
Average number of years of education.  Adults aged 25-29 
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Reported values are based on the self-reported highest education attainment of individuals converted in a number of successfully 
completed years of education.  Past attainment of young adults are proxied by attainment of their contemporary seniors. 
 
Source : Belgian census 1961,1991, 2001 
1.3. Relative score in maths of teenagers: the international comparison 
Critics would argue that the above census-based data are too quantitative. They define performance with the 
number of years of education. It could be more relevant (and convincing) to consider how (cognitive) skills 
have evolved over time. Reliable evidence is limited in this respect — Belgium, unlike France or the US has 
never seriously invested in a proper set of attainment/score indicators that statisticians could use to build time 
series. The few data available come for international surveys organised by the IEA (or more recently by the 
OECD). They cover the score of secondary school pupils. Similar surveys were never developed for tertiary 
education and Belgium and its Communities have rarely participated to those covering primary education.  
 
Table 1.1. shows the evolution of the (relative) average math score for the two linguistic groups between 1965 
and 2000. Reported values are standardized data points (also called Z scores). They correspond to the 
difference between the Community’ average score and the international mean, then divided by the 
international standard deviation. The results just depict how many standard deviations the Community’s score 
is away from the international mean. A positive value of 1.463 for the French-Speaking Community in 1965 
suggests that its pupils largely outperformed (by more than 1.4 standard deviation) those of the other 
participating countries. The Flemish Community did not participate in the 1965survey, — but it did 
participate in the subsequent ones, alongside the French Community.  And the resulting trend largely accords 
with the “quantitative” census-based evidence reported on Figure 1.2.  Whereas the (relative) performance of 
the French Community has steadily deteriorated since the mid-1960s, that of the Flemish Community has 
regularly improved.  
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Table 1.1. Long-term evolution of the relative score in maths of pupils in the Belgian Communities vis-à-vis other EU 
and OECD countries. 
Standardized data points in maths a 
Community 
Year of international survey 
 
 
 
1965 1980 1995 2000 
FIMS SIMS TIMSS PISA 
Flemish - 0,388 0.899 1.140 
French 1.463 0.157 -0.029 -0.258 
 
 
FIMS: First International Mathematics Study 
SIMS: Second International Mathematics Study 
TIMSS: Third International Mathematics and Sciences Study 
PISA: Programme for International Student Assessment 
 
Reported values are standardized data points (also called Z scores). They correspond to the difference between the Community’ 
average score and the international mean, then divide by the international standard deviation. The results just tell how many standard 
deviations the Community’s score is away from the international mean.  
Source: IAE, OCDE 
 
2. What drives educational underachievement in French-Speaking Belgium  
2.1. The socio-economic crisis hitting Brussels, Liège and the Hainaut? 
A popular view is that the real problem rests with the social context in which schools pupils operate – namely, 
the family, neighbourhood, and peer environments that low-income children experience, or excessive school 
segregation.  Adopting education reforms without changing social policy more broadly will simply punish 
educators for factors beyond their control.   
Table 2.1. reports on a crucial indicator of educational attainment: the share of 20-24-year-olds who are no 
longer attending school and who have not obtained an ISCED 3 qualification (upper-secondary degree), who 
can thus be considered as “drop-outs”. Table 2.1 shows the breakdown by Belgian provinces. It gives some 
credit to the idea that poor economic performance contributes to lower educational attainment.  It is the 
Region of Brussels that has the highest drop-out rate (28%), followed by Hainaut (25%) and Liège (23%). 
Seriously improving at-risk children’s schooling outcomes would involve fixing the other social ills associated 
with poverty that impair children’s learning outcomes. In the Belgian context, this means improving (inter alia) 
the labour market outcomes of the adults in the families in which at-risk children develop, particularly in 
regions/provinces that have been severely hit by deindustrialisation (Hainaut, Liège) or have experienced 
massive influxes of (low-skilled) immigrants (Brussels, see Table 2.1). 
But this socio-economic deterministic explanation of educational underachievement calls for some nuances. 
The calendar of the emergence of an inter-regional attainment gap in Belgium (Figure 1.2) does not coincide 
perfectly with the development of inter-regional or sub-regional economic discrepancies. It rather seems that 
educational discrepancies (that probably started in the early 50s) preceded the socio-economic ones (known to 
have emerged in the 1970s and early 1980s). If one can reasonably argue that two-digit unemployment rates 
(and a string of associated social ills) in Brussels, Liège or Hainaut now hamper educational performances of 
youth, there is some reservation as to the role these factors played in the past.  
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Table 2.1. Aged 20-24 without an upper-secondary degree (ISCED3) 
Provinces
 Percentage of  youth 
without ISCED 3
Antwerpen 13.6
Limburg 15.1
Vlaams Brabant 15.2
West-Vlaanderen 11.5
Oost-Vlaanderen 12.6
Rég. Bruxelles-Cap.- Brussel 28.4
Brabant Wallon 13.9
Hainaut 25.2
Liège 23.0
Luxembourg 14.4
Namur 19.6
Women average 14.6
Men average 21.0  
Source: EU-LFS, 2007 
 
2.2. Lack of long-term financial incentives to stay on in education and succeed at school? 
Education can be considered as a form of profitable investment.  Since Adam Smith, economists tend to 
consider that education is similar to a physical means of production e.g. factories and machines (Debande and 
Vandenberghe, 2008; de la Croix and Vandenberghe, 2004). One can invest in human capital via education 
training (but also medical treatment). In that sense, education is similar to fixed capital although it is not 
transferable.  The propensity of individuals to invest in human capital is also presumably driven by similar 
motives as their propensity to invest in, say, shares or bonds. The higher the return on their investment, the 
higher should be their willingness to spend time and other resources accumulating human capital (i.e. reading 
books, attending classes…).  
Within that framework, an almost natural question is whether we have reasons to believe that “education does 
not pay” or at least that it does not pay so much, particularly in the areas forming the French Community, 
where many youth tend to underachieve at school.  
One simple and relatively straightforward way to assess the ‘profitability’ of schooling in Belgium and its 
Communities is to resort to Mincerian wage estimates.6 These basically help understand how earnings are 
related to the educational attainment. And they have proved to be very consistent in virtually every country in 
every time period where they were estimated.  
Results in Table 2.2. are based on EU-SILC7 gross wage and income data. Using these, one can estimate a log-
linear8 wage equation known for delivering estimates of the rate of return associated with one additional year of 
(succesfully completed) schooling. These rates of return are primarily driven by the slope of the 
wage/education curve or the ratio of low-educated individuals’ earnings to better-educated individuals’ 
earnings.  
Panel A of Table 2.2  reports these Mincerian coefficients — computed solely with employed individuals 
earning some wage (i.e. workers) — for Belgium and a selection of EU countries. These suggest the financial 
incentive associated with schooling are average in Belgium compared with other EU countries. At 6.7%, the 
rate of return is higher than in Norway or Denmark — two countries known for their ‘compressed’ wage 
structure — but lower than in France for instance.  
                                                
6  The standard form of the Mincer wage regression is log W = β0 + β1S + β2exp + β3exp2 + ε, where W is the gross wage earned by an 
individual, S is the number of years of formal education he/she attended, and exp and exp2 a 2nd order function of the labour market 
experience (often proxied by age) that captures the propensity of individuals to i) acquire skills “on the job”, and ii) undergo skill depreciation 
over time. 
7  European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions survey. 
8. The advantage of the log-linear specification of the wage W is that it generates estimates for the S explanatory variable coefficient that 
are easy to interpret as they correspond to points of percentage of change of the wage level. For a model logW(S) = β0 + β1S+ ε . 
There is indeed that β1 = dlnW/dS= (dW/W)/dS ≈ [W(S + 1) – W(S)]/W(S) when dS=1. 
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Panel B of Table 2.2 contains, in its first column, similar estimates for each of the Belgian regions.  The figures 
suggest that it is in Brussels that education offers the best return (8.7%), followed by Wallonia (6.7%) and 
Flanders (6.4%). Note already that the two regions with the highest drop-out rate (Table 2.1) are those offering 
the highest rate of return.9 
The second column of the same table reports similar coefficients. But these are computed using data that also 
comprise unemployed and inactive people.  By definition, these categories generally report very low (or no) 
wage/salary income. This means that the estimated coefficients aggregate two types of benefits associated with 
education: i) higher wages when in employment,  ii) and a higher probability of being in employment and 
earning these higher wages. As the risk of zero (or very low) wage (i.e. being out of employment) is much higher 
among low-educated groups, the estimated returns (first column, panel B) are significantly higher than when 
restricting the analysis to the sole workers. Note that it is now in Wallonia that the rate of return is the highest 
(32.6%), followed by Brussels (28.8%) and Flanders (22.1%). Again, the two regions characterised by a higher 
drop-out rate (Table 2.2) are those granting the highest rate of return. 
The last column of panel B, Table 2.2 contains the coefficients that are obtained with the full sample of 
individuals (employed, unemployed and inactive individuals) when state transfers are added to wages (i.e. 
unemployment and other social benefits). As transfers predominantly benefit low-educated people — that are 
more affected by the risk of unemployment and/or are more often inactive —, their inclusion predominantly 
lift their income. This translates into a flatter income/education curve. Logically, this leads to lower rates of 
return. The result also supports the idea that state transfers dampen the return on human capital investment. 
Note, however, that this does not affect our inter-regional comparisons. The two regions characterised by a 
higher drop-out rate remain those where the incentive to invest in education is a priori the highest.10  
Due to data constrains we are not able to explore the effect of income taxation.  But one can reasonably 
speculate that, due to is progressivity, income taxation reduces rates of return. Nonetheless, we do not expect it 
to alter the regional ranking highlighted here. 
 
Table 2.2. Return on Human Capital Investment computed using gross annual earnings. 
A. Belgium and other EU countries 
Country Workers (wages) Probt
Austria 7.79% 0.0000
Belgium 6.77% 0.0000
Denmark 4.88% 0.0000
France 9.26% 0.0000
Germany 8.15% 0.0000
Netherlands 8.39% 0.0000
Norway 6.24% 0.0000
Sweden 4.91% 0.0000
United Kingdom 8.10% 0.0000  
 
B. Belgium and its regions 
Region
Workers 
(wages)
All individuals 
(wages)
All individuals 
(wages and 
transferts)
BXL 8.7% 28.8% 14.4%
VLA 6.4% 22.1% 13.8%
WAL 6.7% 32.6% 16.2%  
                                                
9  Similar results are to be found in de la Croix and Vandenberghe (2004) 
10 We abstain here from considering the so-called “general equilibrium” effects of higher educational attainment.  Many economists would argue 
that if many individuals (say a whole cohort) increases its educational attainment, part of the benefits embedded in the current wage structure 
will vanish. More people holding a certain degree or diploma could translate into a (relative) depreciation of its value on the labour market.  
 13 
2.3. Lack of school resources? 
i) The overall (and long-term) view 
These is simply no correlation, or coincidence, between the emergence of an interregional attainment gap in 
Belgium (Figure 1.2) and the level of public spending on education in Belgium. Many observers in the French 
Community wrongly believe that the devolution of education to the Communities — and the ensuing 
budgetary crisis with its string of austerity plans and strikes — played a crucial role in the emergence of this gap. 
In truth, there are signs since the mid 1990s that teacher pay in the French community has not risen as much as 
in other OECD countries (Table 2.3). Between 1996 and 2006 French-speaking teachers got (cumulated) pay 
increments equal or slightly superior to GDP growth. Whereas across the OECD on average cumulated 
teacher pay rises exceeded that of GDP by 10 to 19%. There is some evidence that the so-called 
“communautarisation” has translated into diverging patterns of teacher pay across the linguistic border (Table 
2.3). In short, during that period wage increments in Flanders slightly exceeded those registered in the French 
Community of Belgium. Note however that the inter-community cumulated differences over the period 1996-
2006 remain small by international standards   
And our main point, however, is that these are very recent developments. And they cannot help us understand 
attainment gaps that emerged in a very distant past, probably somewhere during the late 1950s and early 1960s 
(see Section 1, Figure 1.2).  
 
Table 2.3. Change in teachers' salaries (1996 and 2006) 
Index of change between 1996 and 2006 in teachers' salaries at i) starting salary, ii) after 15 years of experience and iii) at the top of the 
salary scale, by level of education, converted to 2006 price levels using GDP deflators (1996=100).  
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Australia 128 97 97 129 98 98 129 98 98
Belgium (Fl.) 107 111 114 104 104 104 104 104 104
Belgium (Fr.) 101 106 109 99 100 100 99 100 100
Denmark 122 113 110 122 113 110 112 110 105
England 124 107 107 124 107 107 124 107 107
Finland 132 129 158 130 116 140 127 123 148
Greece 116 118 121 112 115 118 112 115 118
Hungary 209 196 201 209 196 201 182 189 204
Ireland 111 118 113 105 112 112 105 112 112
Italy 111 111 111 110 110 110 110 110 110
Japan 107 117 104 107 117 104 107 117 104
Mexico 134 133 134 135 138 142 m m m
Netherlands 103 110 100 102 111 100 102 107 99
New Zealand 101 115 115 101 115 115 101 115 115
Norway 104 96 105 104 96 105 103 100 101
Portugal 103 112 102 103 112 102 103 112 102
Scotland 120 115 115 120 115 115 120 115 115
Spain 95 95 92 m m m 94 94 91
Unweighted average 118 116 117 119 116 117 114 113 114
Primary education Lower secondary education Upper secondary education, 
general programmes
 
 
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2008 
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ii) Enough resources for at-risk pupils? 
A related discussion is the one about the propensity of the education system in Belgium to adequately 
concentrate resources on those who need them most. Do at-risk pupils receive adequate support in French-
Speaking schools?   
Providing a thorough and well-documented answer to this question is clearly beyond the scope of this review. 
However PISA 2006 contains some items that can help us shed some light on the issue. A simple econometric 
exercise focusing on math score11 at the age of 15 essentially reveals the following: 
• Belgium (both Communities) is the only country12 where the number of students per teacher is 
significantly smaller in schools concentrating aged 15 pupils with lower math scores. There is also, in 
the French Community, that the number of computers for instruction (per student) is higher in 
these schools; 
• But, Belgium (both Communities) is the only country with Canada where the proportion of 
teachers with a university qualification (ISCED 5A) is significantly lower in those schools.   
• The French Community of Belgium is the only entity where recruiting and stabilising teachers is 
reportedly more difficult in schools concentrating pupils with lower math scores. 
In a nutshell, these results seem to suggest that French-Speaking schools serving the lower segments of the 
public have more resources (more teachers or computer per pupil). But they may simultaneously suffer for a 
lower-than-average quality of teaching staff.13 Low-achieving pupils are taught in smaller classes but by less 
qualified and less experienced teachers. This raises the question of whether additional money spent on those 
schools is adequately allocated. What do poor and underachieving students need in priority:  smaller classes 
equipped with computers or better and more experienced teachers? 
2.4. Underperforming schools? 
A more promising way of gaining further insight as to what drives poor educational attainment is to compare 
the attainment of Dutch- vs. French-Speaking schools conditional on the socio-economic status of their 
pupils.  The exercise is somehow similar to the one we did when we discussed long-term/historical trends. It is 
to split the overall variance of results into two parts. One that points at socio-economic (deterministic) factors, 
beyond the immediate control of policy-makers, which can be unevenly distributed across the two 
communities (i.e. more children with an immigration background in the French-Speaking system ….) . And 
the other part14 supportive of other explanatory factors like cultural specificities15 or diverging degree of school 
effectiveness — something a priori more in line with what an economist would hypothesise. The exercise can 
be carried out using 2006 PISA data on test scores of 15-year-olds. On Figure 2. 1 below, each dot represents 
the average attainment within one of the schools sampled by PISA. The horizontal axis shows the average 
socio-economic mix of the pupils sampled in the school (20 to 40 per school). The vertical axis measures the 
average score in math of the same students within the school. Figure 2.2 contains the results of a very similar 
exercise, but where the horizontal axis displays the share of pupils attending a vocational track within the 
schools.  It thus controls for the curricula pupils are actually exposed to.16 
What emerges is that — whatever the socio-economic profile 17 or the importance of vocational education — 
pupils in Dutch-Speaking schools tend to outperform those enrolled in French-Speaking ones (refer to 
appendixes 1 & 2 for similar results in science and reading literacy). The results on display in Figure 2.1 and 2.2 
are largely confirmed by a more thorough and elaborated econometric analysis. The gross score gap in math 
between the French and the Dutch-speaking pupils is estimated to be of 9.1% (i.e. using the French 
community as a benchmark, the math score are 9.1% higher in Flanders). When we condition on (potentially 
                                                
11 Similar results as those reported hereafter emerge when analysing science and reading scores. 
12 The comparison includes Canada, Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark; countries that are known for their (relatively) smaller SES-related 
score gap. 
13 That can be interpreted in terms of vertical differentiation (Debande and Vandenberghe, 2008). 
14 In fact a residual. 
15 A relatively greater willingness to learn/educate in one Community. 
16 Although this should be questioned in theory, in Belgium it is often taken for granted that pupils who attend a vocational track are less 
exposed to the “core” topics (math, sciences and reading) evaluated by PISA. 
17 That, in both linguistic groups, is a strong predictor of performance. Belgium (alongside Germany and the Netherlands) is characterised by a 
big score gap between i) schools concentrating low-SES aged 15 pupils, and ii) those serving the more privileged segments of the population. 
The best performer on this indicator is Finland. Sweden is the country that represents the closest match to Finland in terms of its capacity to 
minimise the score gap between high- and low-SES schools. Then come Norway, Spain, Denmark, Canada, the United States, Great Britain, 
Italy, France. The worst-performers in this respect are Belgium (both communities), Germany and the Netherlands (Vandenberghe, 2009).  
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important) cross-Community differences in terms of : i) socio-economic profile (both parental profession and 
material wealth18), ii) immigration background19, iii) attendance of a vocational track20  , or iv) pupil/teacher 
ratio… the resulting net gap appears even slightly higher21 at 10.8%.22 
 
Figure 2.1 .Distribution of educational attainment in Math23 across schools 
(conditional on the socio-economic profile of pupils). 
Flemish vs. French Community. 
 
Source: PISA, OECD, 2006 
                                                
18 The average  material wealth index reported in PISA is higher for Flanders than the French-Speaking Community (see Appendix 2 for more 
details). 
19 There are more children reportedly with an immigration background in the French-Speaking Community than in Flanders (see Appendix 2 for 
more details). 
20 But there are significantly more children attending a vocational programme in the Dutch-speaking Community (see Appendix 2 for more 
details).. 
21 A possible interpretation of this increment is that the net gap « corrects » for the (clearly higher) incidence of vocational education in Flanders 
(see appendix 3). 
22 For an analysis of this gap based on frontier-estimation methods see Perelman, Pestieau & Santin (2010). 
23 Appendixes 1 and 2 display the results for science and reading. 
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Figure  2.2 . Distribution of educational attainment in Math24 across schools 
(conditional on the importance of vocational education (VET)25). 
Flemish vs. French Community. 
 
Source: PISA, OECD, 2006 
3. What policy vis-à-vis underperforming schools 
3.1. Rapid overview of what is said in the international literature 
Disagreements about how to improve these schools’ outcomes loom large. They stem in part from different 
beliefs about what problems underlie their unsatisfactory outcomes.  Broadly speaking, critics tend to invoke, at 
least implicitly, one of the following reasons (Jacob and Ludwig, 2008):  
First, schools matter only so much.  The real problem rests with the social context in which schools operate – 
namely, the family, neighbourhood, and peer environments that low-income children experience, or excessive 
school segregation.  Adopting accountability education reforms without changing social policy more broadly 
will simply punish educators for factors beyond their control, and potentially drive the most able teachers 
toward schools serving less disadvantaged students.  In this case, a necessary condition for making serious 
improvements in at-risk children’s schooling outcomes would involve fixing the other social ills associated with 
poverty. In the Belgian context, as stated above, this means improving the labour market outcomes of the 
adults in the families in which at-risk children live, particularly in regions/provinces that have been severely hit 
by deindustrialisation (ie. Hainaut, Liège) or have experienced massive influxes of (low-skilled) immigrants (ie. 
Brussels) (see Table 2.1). 
Second, schools matter but those serving at-risk students need more resources (e.g., teachers, textbooks, 
support services) than the other schools to educate the disadvantaged students.  In this case, a potential 
solution would be to provide more money to disadvantaged schools.26  There is evidence that, to a certain 
extent, this is already done in the French Community. There are also plenty of indications that its decision-
                                                
24 Appendix I displays the results for science and reading. 
25 The share of pupils attending a vocational programme/track. 
26 More on how this can be implemented in Waltenberg and Vandenberghe (2007). 
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makers are willing to further “differentiate” school funding according to the socio-economic profile of students. 
But more research is needed to identify how these resources should be spent. Should, as seems to be the case 
now, these extra resources predominantly finance smaller class sizes ? Or should they be used to attract (or 
simply retain) better and more experienced teachers? (see Section 2.3) 
Third, schools concentrating low-achieving children lack the capacity to improve students’ learning, 
independent of financial resources.  Under this perspective, the teachers and the heads of school serving highly 
disadvantaged pupils are thought to lack the (managerial) skills or knowledge necessary to improve the quality 
of instruction on their own.  Potential solutions to this problem would involve helping schools improve the 
quality of their standard operating practices, for example by helping implement specific new instructional or 
organizational practices (i.e. curriculum, instruction, school organization) and/or increasing the instructional 
capacity of staff in these schools through professional development, and perhaps also more selective hiring.  
Fourth, these schools do not have sufficient incentives and/or flexibility to make the best possible use of their 
resources.  They are under-performing because teachers and heads of school are not working hard enough, 
they are not working toward the right goal. Or they have good local knowledge about what would work best but 
they are not able to implement these ideas because of centralized authority (bureaucratic rigidities, red-
tape…).  Proponents of this perspective often claim that without i) clarifying the key objectives of school, ii) 
holding key actors accountable while iii) granting them more autonomy, additional spending will simply be 
squandered.  Under this view, the solution would be to enhance output-based incentives and provide 
professionals more autonomy.  
3.2. PISA score and school autonomy/flexibility  
It is possible to find some empirical support regarding the benefits of school autonomy/flexibility in PISA 2006. 
Figure 3.1. displays the positive relationship27 between net average score and the school autonomy index. It is 
important to stress that the scores (on the vertical axis) are “net” of the mechanical contribution of a range of 
socio-economic (parental socio-professional status, household material wealth, immigration background), 
curricular (vocational track attendance) or spending factors (number of pupils per teacher in the sampled 
schools). The index displayed on the horizontal axis proxies the degree of autonomy characterizing key aspects 
of the functioning of schools. It is equal to (country/community-averaged) number of dimensions of school 
management that the head of school declares being his/her direct responsibility vs. that of and intermediate 
(i.e. municipalities or provinces in the case of Belgium) or central school authority (the Ministry of Education). 
Dimensions examined by the PISA survey comprise (1) teacher hire, (2) teacher fire, (3) establishing starting 
salaries (4) determining salary increase (5) establishing the school’s overall budget; (6) allocating this budget; (7) 
student discipline rules; (8) student assessment (exams and grades); (9) student admission; (10) choice of 
textbooks. 
One point worth stressing is that, like Hindriks & Verschelde (2010),we find that there is more school 
autonomy on average in the Flemish Community than in the French Community (see Appendix 4 and 
Vandenberghe and Robin (2004) for a discussion of how decentralisation/autonomy is related to the private vs. 
public provision of schooling). 
 
                                                
27 In true, a simple positive correlation 
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Figure 3.1. School autonomya and math scoreb across countries that participated to PISA 2006 
 
(a) The decentralisation/autonomy index is simply the (country/community-averaged) number of dimensions of school 
management that the head of school declares being his/her direct responsibility vs. that of and intermediate or central school 
authority. Dimensions examined comprise (1) teacher hire, (2) teacher fire, (3) starting salary (4) determining salary increase (5) 
writing the school’s overall budget; (6) allocating the budget (7) writing the student discipline rules (8) student assessment (9)  
student admission  (10) choice of textbooks. 
(b) The raw score are first regressed on several variables that are likely to capture socio-economic, ability or spending differences 
across countries. They include the highest parental socio-professional index, the family material wealth index, the immigration 
background, the average pupil to teacher ratio. The residuals (i.e. the part of the raw score that cannot be ascribed to these 
factors) are then used to compute the values plotted on this figure.  
 
3.3. Some thoughts about the state of school governance in the French Community 
The above evidence suggests that school autonomy/flexibility is important. It is plausible, however, that is 
matters only as part of a broader set of key ingredients that need to be properly aligned in order to maximize 
school performance. We will argue hereafter that one of the French Community of Belgium’s hurdles is to 
overcome it recurrent inability to align meaningfully key ingredients forming a proper school governance 
regime.  
There is a growing consensus among education economists (Levin, 1997; Wössmann & Fuchs, 2007; Hindriks 
& Verschelde, 2010) that educational output, apart from each individual's propensity to invest in himself28, is 
conditioned by the educational system's governance (i.e. large-scale mechanisms or general rules on which 
teachers and schools have no direct control, because they are the result of political aggregation or historical 
trends, but nonetheless significantly influence their daily practice). The so-called 'supply side' of the 
educational process can no longer be represented as a simple black box (Vandenberghe, 1999a).  
i) Benchmarks : bureaucracies, incentive contracts or quasi-markets 
Belfied (2000) reviews the range of governance mechanisms that are found in education. He first explains that 
very few educational systems29 operate like proper markets, where 'providers' (schools, teachers…) are 
                                                
28 Extensively analysed by the human capital model (Schultz, 1961; Becker, 1964) and possibly driven by wage premia documented in Section 2.2 
29 Delivering elementary/basic (primary or secondary) education. 
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financed directly by their 'clients' through (variable) fees, and where the 'clients' enjoy extended freedom of 
choice as to the provider they pick.30 
In the educational sector, the most common and prevalent regulation modus operandi is still the hierarchical 
or bureaucratic model. The latter generally grants no freedom of choice to pupils and their families. Zoning 
regulations, as in the US, France, Norway or Sweden (until the early 1990s), force pupils to attend the nearest 
local school. Public administrators supervise local decision-makers (teachers, school heads). Administrators 
evaluate the educational needs of the population, plan the construction of schools and other facilities, appoint 
teachers, fix wages and pension schemes for educational staff, determine both the curricula or the certification 
criteria. In brief, the (central) Minister of education personifies the external co-ordination principle, the 
governance structure of the system.31 
But the bureaucratic model is no longer the only possible governance regime. During the 1970's and 1980's one 
first witnessed a renewed interest in the regulation of public monopolies and oligopolies through incentive 
contracts. This led to greater decentralisation of decision-making (i.e. more autonomy/flexibility for schools 
and teachers) and, simultaneously, a greater use of contractual arrangements to ensure compliance with public 
priorities. Schools would still act as (local) monopolists but the amount of financial resources they received 
from the government would depend on their ability to meet centrally-defined (and assessed) objectives. This 
new approach led to the development of output-based (public) financing schemes, a greater use of 
standardized test to gauge pupils’ results. 
The other source of innovation was the introduction of market-like mechanisms. The main idea was that it 
must be possible to preserve free (i.e. publicly funded) education and to mobilise the expertise of final users in 
order to (advantageously) replace the central authority as a source of control.  This led to the introduction of so-
called quasi-markets. It was argued that by allowing – properly informed – parents (or youth) to choose their 
school, governments would force schools to be more accountable to their clients and make a better use of their 
resources. In quasi-markets, successful decision-making at the school level is rewarded financially by an 
automatic mechanism, a school's budget is directly indexed on the number of pupils attracted via a voucher 
system.32 Be it in Chile, New Zealand or Sweden, quasi-market reforms were aimed at solving 'bureaucratic 
failure' problems: lack of efficiency, low accountability of teachers, excessive red tape (Vandenberghe, 1999b).  
ii) The situation in French-Speaking Belgium 
In the literature, researchers debate on the relative merits of hierarchies, incentive contracts and education 
quasi-markets. We argue that such a discussion is not (yet) the most relevant one for the French Community of 
Belgium. What pundits should rather consider (and combat) is the excessively hybrid nature of its school 
governance regime (Vandenberghe, 2007).  
Hybrid governance exists to a certain extent in Flanders and in many other places in the world.  But, in 
comparison, it has probably loomed larger in the French Community.  The current governance regime 
consists of a relatively unarticulated and chaotic addition of the three models exposed above. Over the past 
decades, French-Speaking decision-makers have been unable to agree on the amount of power to be granted 
to (1) the central Ministry, (2) the local professionals (heads of schools) and (3) parents or pupils.  Sempiternal 
divergences of view, echoing deeply rooted philosophical and political schisms, have ultimately led to a 
situation where the top-down/bureaucratic control (the obligation to implement instructions coming from 
Brussels) systematically cohabits with school-based autonomy and market-driven school management (the 
necessity to attract pupils to secure resources and jobs). 
School choice and quasi-markets 
For several decades the system — including primary, secondary and tertiary education — has espoused the 
quasi-market principle as it has combined extended freedom of school choice and public (per-pupil) financing.  
Schools with dwindling enrollment are fully aware that they are bound to lose resources (i.e. teaching jobs). It is 
                                                
30 Exceptions exist, particularly in Third-World countries like Kenya, Sri Lanka or India where private education is still the rule for thousands of 
pupils at elementary and secondary level. But many 'private' schools are non-profit organisations, ruled by religious communities that manage to 
limit costs (and fees) essentially by relying on volunteers. 
31 This does not mean that the educational system is necessarily always totally centralised. Like all complex institutions, hierarchic educational 
systems are characterised by a certain balance between decentralisation and centralisation. Invariably, educational systems throughout the 
world delegate some responsibilities to schools and – inside those organisations – to the individual teacher 
32 An explicit (where each child receives a voucher) or an implicit one (whereby schools are predominantly funded on a per-pupil basis).  
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also common practice to spend some of the school resources to put ads in the local papers in order to 
inform/lure prospective pupils. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some schools require their teachers to hit the 
street at the end of August to reach out to their potential clientele. 
Subsidised schools and the contractual approach to education provision  
School choice is accompanied by an old tradition of entrepreneurial freedom as to schooling delivery (on the 
supply side thus).  Belgium indeed comprises a larger number of so-called subvented « pouvoir organisateurs/ 
inrichtende machten » syndicated in three networks (« les réseaux/ netwerkers ») delivering schooling services 
alongside the central authority. Incidentally, it is worth stressing that a very significant part of educational 
services in Belgium are delivered by schools that are (legally) independent (or ‘free’) from the central 
ministerial authority.  Quite logically, in such a context, the contractual approach to education provision has 
gained importance. Although central authority funds schools, the advocates of such a model claim that those 
who run schools on a daily base are best placed to decide on how to spend these funds, starting with the 
recruitment of teachers. And the external control by the central authority should primarily focus on the schools’ 
contribution to pupils’ attainment (i.e. final outcomes).  However, one must immediately stress that output-
based control of autonomous school has been long absent from the landscape.  
Superimposed hierarchical and bureaucratic control 
There is also a (now deeply entrenched) tradition of bureaucratic control of schools, that encompasses ‘free’ 
subvented ones. It is based on the precepts of central planning and orchestrated by the Minister of Education 
and its administration in Brussels. The range of regulatory requirements applicable to (all) schools have loomed 
larger over the past decades, particularly in the French Community.  They primarily consist of controlling the 
way schools use their inputs.33 Many of the rules applicable to ‘free’ schools aim at aligning the employment 
status of their teachers on that of civil servants.  Schools do not control salary levels. Teachers are not paid at 
school level, but directly by the Ministry of education. Heads of schools cannot decide upon the relative 
importance of compensation and benefits (by opting for more/less capital-intensive technologies for example). 
But, at the same time, heads of school are strongly enticed to respond to market pressures stemming from the 
school choice and the per capita/voucher funding ingredient. 
The Ministry of Education defines teaching credentials which schools must respect when hiring or awarding 
tenure. Relatively stringent seniority rules limit the capacity of school heads to decide on the teachers they keep 
on board when enrollment plunges. Weekly schedules and other conditions of work are centrally determined 
too. Over the past two decades, the central authority in French-Speaking Belgium has also been very active in 
prescribing the pedagogy to be used by teachers, but without properly considering the other constraints schools 
have to cope with. Consider, for instance, the uncomfortable situation of a primary school teacher who has 
been firmly instructed to organise the learning cycle over periods of 2 to 3 years34 but — due to extensive 
freedom of choice — experiences a 50 to 60% turnover in her class every year. 
Hybrid governance and poor performance 
Our main concern is that hybrid governance contributes negatively to the overall performance, and in 
particular to that of the most deprived segments of the population (see Figure 2.1). These are a priori more 
‘dependent’ on the quality of education to succeed academically and professionally. Ideally, education should 
be jointly produced with a contribution from both the demand side (pupils/students and their families) and the 
supply side (teachers, schools and the public authorities that finance education).  But at-risk pupils, coming 
from broken/ dysfunctional families, are obviously more affected by the way the supply side is structured and 
operates.  They are much less able to compensate or protect themselves from the consequences of ill-
conceived or poorly implemented educational policy (Levin, 1997). 
                                                
33 As stated earlier there is no tradition of output-based control of schools in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium. 
34 The so-called « apprentissage par cycles ». 
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iii) Why so much hybridisation ? 
Our thesis is that the hybrid governance regime that characterises French-Speaking schools largely echoes the 
diverging political and philosophical “preferences” of the three main “réseaux/netwerken”. The educational 
landscape is split in two big groups (those who defend the public provision of schooling and those who prefer 
the provision by ‘free’ subvented schools), each representing about 50% of the total number of pupils. In 
addition, the advocates of public provision are split between those who defend local provision (by 
municipalities or provinces) and those who favour a centralised model where public schools are under the sole 
jurisdiction of the central ministry. 
Contrary to most observers, we do not believe that the main problem associated with the presence of 
“réseaux/netwerken” is cost-inefficiency. The total cost of the system is primarily the result of a product : the 
number of enrolled pupils X what is spent per pupil on average. The presence of “réseaux/netwerken” [or 
hundreds of pouvoirs organisateurs/ inrichtende machten] has clearly no impact on the total number of pupils. 
Some would argue that multiple “réseaux/netwerken” has lead to a higher incidence of small schools (known 
for their higher cost per pupil ceteris paribus). But successive reforms since the early 1980s have resulted in the 
introduction  of mandatory enrollment thresholds limiting the magnitude of this problem. A secondary school 
for example cannot exist (receive public funding) if it enrols less than 430 pupils. Similar (but logically lower) 
thresholds exists for primary schools.  Exploiting economies of scale has proved feasible within a system where 
individual schools are syndicated into so-called networks.   
The true “cost” of the “réseaux/netwerken” rather corresponds to their contribution to the emergence of a very 
hybrid governance regime.  The systematic involvement of their representatives in the policy-making process 
has prevented (and keeps preventing) the emergence of a coherent governance framework. This is because the 
models of governance they explicitly or implicitly refer to when they bargain are a priori contradictory and 
difficult to reconcile. What is more, the Minister of education in the French Community is suffering from a 
lack of pre-eminence and independence vis-à-vis the « réseaux », as one of its mandates it to run and defend 
the interests of its own « réseau » of schools. 
Sceptics would rightly argue that networks (and the underlying antagonist conceptions as to what “good” 
school governance means) also exist in Flanders. True. But in Flanders, the network syndicating ‘free’ catholic-
affiliated schools is (and has always been) very dominant; with a market share exceeding 70% of the total.  This 
has perhaps contributed to limit the ravages of the hybrid governance disease French-Speaking pupils suffer 
from.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Distribution of educational attainment in Science across schools (conditional on the socio-economic 
profile of pupils). Flemish vs. French Community. 
 
Source: PISA, OECD, 2006 
Plotted trends correspond to OLS-estimated quadratic relationship between scores and SES 
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Appendix 2 
Distribution of educational attainment in Reading across schools (conditional on the socio-economic profile of 
pupils). Flemish vs. French Community. 
 
Source: PISA, OECD, 2006 
Appendix 3 
 
Pisa 2006 – Descriptive statistics  
 
Var iab le BFL BFR
Math score 545.82 500.99
Science score 531.35 495.68
Reading score 524.34 483.55
Higher parental socio-professional 
index 49.80 50.62
Family material wealth index 0.38 -0.07
Number of students per teacher 
(reported average at the school level)8.70 9.90
Vocational track attendance 0.54 0.36
Pupils with immigration background 0.07 0.20
Private government-dependent 
school attencance 0.73 0.56
Nobs 5124 3733
Communtiy
 
Source: OECD, PISA 2006 
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Appendix 4 
 
Pisa 2006 –  School autonomy index in Belgium. Breakdown by linguistic community and school 
ownership/legal regime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) The decentralisation/autonomy index is simply the (country/community-averaged) number of dimensions of school management 
that the head of school declares being his/her direct responsibility vs. that of and intermediate or central school authority. 
Dimensions examined comprise (1) teacher hire, (2) teacher fire, (3) estibising. starting sal (4) determining sal. Increase (5) writing 
the school’s overall budg; (6) allocating the budget (7) writing the student discipline rules (8) student assessment (9)  student 
admission  (10) choice of textbooks. 
b) Government-dependent schools are those that receive the greatest part of their financial resources from the public authorities 
(typically the “écoles libres catholiques/ vrije katholieke scholen” in Belgium) 
 
Community 
Public 
School 
Private Government-
Dependentb School 
Flemish-Speaking 7.85 7.86 
French-Speaking 4.94 7.07 
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Why is the performance of Flemish and 
French speaking students so different? 
A stochastic frontier approach 
 
Sergio Perelman (Université de Liège) 
Pierre Pestieau (Université de Liège & UCLouvain) 
Daniel Santin (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) 
 
 
 
1. Introduction35 
PISA, the Program for International Student Assessment (OECD, 2007) evaluated students’ performances of 
15 years old children in 57 countries in 2006. In Belgium near 9,000 children participated in the Flemish, 
French and German Communities altogether. The results presented in Table 1 are average scores for the three 
tests: mathematics, reading and science. Students in the French Community are far away, 50 points in average, 
from students in the Flemish Community. With these scores the Flemish Community is among the top 
OECD countries and the French Community just below the OECD average. Also standard errors are higher 
in the French Community and indicate high dispersion of results compared with the Flemish Community. 
The German Community average scores and standard errors lie between those of the other two communities. 
 
Table 1. Average scores by community - PISA 2006 
Community Reading Mathematics Science Mean 
Flemish 529.3 (97.7) 
550.2 
(93.3) 
535.5 
(87.6) 
538.3 
(88.5) 
French 480.8 (105.1) 
499.4 
(99.3) 
490.5 
(100.6) 
490.2 
(95.9) 
German 505.1 (99.6) 
520.2 
(93.0) 
520.6 
(94.8) 
515.3 
(90.4) 
Belgium 511.4 (102.8) 
530.9 
(98.0) 
519.6 
(94.9) 
520.6 
(93.8) 
Note: Standard deviations in brackets. 
 
The question we address in this paper is simple: which factors can explain the performance gap between the 
Flemish and French-speaking students? Do they rest on pedagogical, financial, institutional considerations? 
Our hope is to deduce from this exercise some policy implications. Anticipating on what follows, we show that 
most of the performance slack cannot be explained with available variables; as a consequence, the way to 
improve the educational performance of the French community is still unclear. 
To explain performance slacks, we rely on a stochastic frontier analysis estimation using students’ individual 
data. Each student test scores are compared with an estimated best practice frontier, which is built taking into 
                                                
35 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 18ème Congrès des Economistes Belges de Langue Française (Perelman et al., 2009). 
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account students’ social background, peer group effects and schools’ resources. 
There exist a number of studies trying to explain those differences in scores by factors such as autonomy of 
schools, social origin of the students, size of classes, average spending, etc.36 All these studies have in common 
to be unable to explain most of the performance gap between the two Communities. In a recent work Hirtt 
(2008) provides an interesting answer to that outgoing problem. His objective is to explain the differences in the 
scores in mathematics for PISA 2006. He does that simply on the basis of a simple regression explaining 
individuals’ scores by social origin, immigration status, multiplicity of tracks, school backwardness and attitude 
vis-à-vis the PISA questionnaire. He is thus able to explain 25% of the difference between Flanders and the 
French Community.  
This paper belongs to that vein of research. It applies the efficiency frontier approach37 to PISA 2006, which 
rests on a wider sample and provides more information than the previous PISA waves. Indeed we have now 
detailed information on the way students are selected and the degree of autonomy of school management.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly present the data. Then we measure the 
degree of performance of each student belonging to the sample and then we try to explain performance slacks. 
A final section concludes.  
 
 
2. Descriptive analysis of PISA 2006 
In this section we present the main features concerning Belgian schools and students in PISA 2006 focusing on 
the differences between the three Communities (Dutch, French and German speaking) and between the two 
main types of schools, General and Vocational (TAP hereafter, TAP for Technical, Artistic and Professional). 
The first part of Table 2 gives an overview of the schooling structure as it appears from the sample of students 
aged 15 in 2006. One discovers that in the Flemish Community, 53.7% of students are in vocational schools 
(TAP) whereas this proportion falls to 43.5% and 41.7% in the French and the German Communities 
respectively. In Flanders three quarters of students are in private (mostly catholic) schools whereas this fraction 
is 59.9% and 50.9% in the French and the German comunities.  
The score gap in reading skills is about 100 points between the two types of schools, general and vocational, in 
the three communities. One finds also an important gap between students attending private schools and those 
attending state schools, the gap being to the favor of the former. This gap is relatively low in the French 
Community.  
The second part of Table 2 underlines two key features of the student population: their origin 
(allochtone/autochtone) and their possible schooling backwardness at 15. One observes first that the 
percentage of allochtones students, defined as either the student either her both parents born abroad, makes 
about one quarter in the French Community (24.3%) and is even higher in the German Community (27.7%), 
in contrast with the low 9.0% among the Flemish students. At the same time, the gap in reading scores between 
autochthones and allochtones is by far the highest in the Flemish Community: close to 100 points (448.1 versus 
537.1). It is only 30 points in the German Community (482.4 versus 513.7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
36 See Zachary et al. (2002), Lafontaine and Baye (2007), Hirtt (2008), Verschelde et al. (2009), and Vandenberghe (2010), in this volume, among 
others. 
37 We use in this paper the methodology introduced by Perelman and Santin (2011) to study the performance of Spanish public and private 
education networks on behalf of PISA 2003 data.   
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Table 2. Average reading scores - School and student characteristics 
 
Characteristics 
 
Flemish 
Community 
French 
Community 
German 
Community 
Part (%) Score (std) Part (%) Score (std) Part (%) Score (std) 
All 100.0 529.3 (97.7) 100.0 
480.8 
(105.1) 100.0 
505.1 
(99.6) 
School 
Type       
   General 46.3 587.1 (67.6) 56.5 
523.9 
(90.7) 58.3 
540.2 
(91.6) 
   Vocational (TAP) 53.7 478.8 (91.7) 43.5 
421.0 
(94.9) 41.7 
455.4 
(88.9) 
Authority       
   Public 24.6 493.5 (101.8) 40.1 
460.6 
(104.0) 49.1 
474.2 
(96.4) 
   Private 75.4 541.1 (93.3) 59.9 
493.4 
(104.5) 50.9 
534.1 
(93.8) 
Student 
Origin       
   Autochthon 91.0 537.1 (92.9) 75.7 
494.0 
(103.0) 72.3 
513.7 
(94.8) 
   Allochton 1 9.0 448.1 (108.6) 24.3 
440.2 
(92.4) 27.7 482.4 (108.3) 
Scholar career       
   Without backwardness  75.3 554.6 (82.8) 54.2 
529.5 
(86.1) 58.6 
549.7 
(80.4) 
   Backward one year or +  24.7 478.8 (91.7) 45.8 
419.9 
(95.4) 41.4 
440.6 
(91.7) 
Notes: Special education excluded. 1 Either the student, either her both parents, was born abroad. 
 
As to the score gap between students without and with backwardness, it is the lowest in the Flemish 
Community where the phenomenon of grade repetition is also the lowest: 24.7% relative to rates above 40% in 
the other Communities. We now turn to three factors, which are often cited, in scientific work to explain 
schooling achievement: 1) family background, 2) peer group, and 3) available resources.  
Concerning family background PISA 2006 provides a number of data (e.g., parents’ occupation, cultural 
background) that are summarized in a synthetic indicator of Economic, Social and Cultural Status (hereafter 
ESCS). This individual indicator is used to build at the school level an indicator reflecting the sociocultural 
level of each school.  Those two indicators are presented in Table 3 for each Community distinguishing 
between private and public schools.  
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Table 3. Educational inputs: public vs. private schools 
Average values by community 
 
Educational inputs 
Flemish 
Community 
French 
Community 
German 
Community 
Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Family background (ESCS) 1       
   - of the student 5.43 5.77 5.39 5.72 5.57 5.65 
   - of the peer group 5.54 5.88 5.50 5.83 5.68 5.76 
School resources       
   - quality (SCMATEDU) 2 3.13 2.96 2.64 2.76 2.54 2.23 
   - hours/week of mathematics 2.80 3.23 3.41 3.49 3.56 3.57 
Notes: Special education excluded.  
1 ESCS: Synthetic indicator representing the economic, social and cultural family status based on three type of 
information: highest occupational and educational level reached by parents and cultural belongs. Rank of variation: 1 to 
8.44. 
2 SCMATEDU: Synthetic indicator representing de level of inadequacy of school resources: pedagogical and audiovisual 
material, computers, software and Internet access, library. Rank of variation: 1 to 5.07. 
Source: OECD (2009), pages 340-346. 
 
 
It can be noted that the ESCS indicator of a student and that of his school are consistently higher in private 
schools than in public schools. On average the ESCS of a student and that of his school are not much 
different. In contrast at the individual level, one observes wide differences.  
School resources are represented by two variables reflecting the quality of the available equipment and the 
number of hours of mathematics delivered. The first variable is a synthetic indicator of quality labeled 
SCMATEDU that measures the adequacy of educational equipment with the objectives of the relevant 
school. It is based on questions addressed to the school managers on the availability of equipments such as 
libraries, computing facilities, etc. As to the number of math hours it is taken as proxy for the available 
pedagogical means. 
Table 3 shows that the indicator of school resources (SCMATEDU) measuring the quality of equipment is 
higher in the Flemish Community than in the others. For the math hours, one gets the opposite outcome. The 
index SCMATEDU is higher in private than in public schools in the French Community; the opposite is true 
in the two other Communities. 
A last word on three characteristics of schools under study: selection policies, autonomy and the skill of 
teachers. Table 4 gives an overview of these characteristics. First there is more selectivity in Flemish schools 
particularly in the private ones. In contrast in the French Community, a quarter of public schools and only 
one tenth of private schools are selective. As to the degree of autonomy and responsabilisation of schools 
management, it is relatively higher in the Flemish schools particularly the private ones. Finally, we have the 
qualification of teachers; one finds the most qualified in private schools, specially in the German speaking 
ones. 
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Table 4. Other school’s characteristics 
 
Variables 
Flemish 
Community 
French 
Community 
German 
Community 
Public Private Public Public Private Public 
Students’ selectivity (%)    
(SELECT) 1 30.4 39.0 24.8 8.1 0.0 26.3 
School autonomy                     
(RESPRES) 2 1.658 1.857 1.107 1.114 1.077 1.130 
Teachers’ qualification (%) 
(PROP5A) 3 33.0 38.7 31.8 37.2 38.8 65.4 
Notes: Special education excluded.  
1 Students’ selectivity (binary variable): SELECT indicates if the school selects students on behalf of previous reported results and 
potential recommendation letters.  
2 School autonomy: RESPRES is a synthetic indicator corresponding to the level of school autonomy and responsabilisation, e.g. 
budget and staff management. Rank of variation: 1 to 4.12. 
3 Teachers’ qualification: PROP5A indicates the share of teachers with university degree diploma.  
Source: OECD (2009), pages 307-310. 
 
 
3. Measuring the inefficiency of 15 year old  
The methodology38 used here allows for simultaneously measuring the distance of each student’ practice 
relative to the best practice and for explaining those distances on the basis of factors that are more or less 
exogenous. Figure 1 illustrates these concepts in a simple setting with two outputs. We assume in this example 
that there are two decision units, students A and C, who start with the same level of resources to produce two 
outputs y1 and y2, which represent scores in math and in reading respectively. C is efficient because his scores 
put him on the frontier whereas A is inside the frontier and his level of efficiency is given by the ratio OA/OB 
where B is the best practice score he should aim at and A is his actual score. 
 
Figure 1. Best practice educational frontier 
 
                                                
38 Battese and Coelli (1995) 
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To construct the best practice frontier and calculate the degree of inefficiency, we consider 3 outputs and 4 
inputs, being the decision unit the student belonging to the sample of PISA. The 3 outputs are the scores in 
mathematics, reading and science, and the 4 inputs are the ESCS of the student, that of his school, the quality 
of resources (SMATEDU) and the number of math hours per week. 
As expected, the first two inputs have a dominant effect. We obtain for each student an index of efficiency; we 
have calculated the mean value of these efficiency scores for each community. They are presented on Table 5.  
The observed means are those of Table 1, those of PISA 2006. Focusing on the French and the Flemish 
Communities we have a difference of 48.1 points. Going from the observed scores to the ideal ones, those 
consistent with the best practice, we obtain a difference of 7.4 (634.5-627.1) and thus an efficiency gap of 
40.7 (96.2 – 136.9) to the benefit of Flanders. Note that the ideal scores in the two Communities vary to the 
extent that the educational technology is not linear. The efficiency gap between the two Communities is 
smaller than the observed scores gap as the best practice frontier of the French Community is below that of 
Flanders. In other words, a part of the observed gap (7.4/48.1), namely about 15%, can be explained by this 
difference in best practices.  
We still have to explain this gap of 40.7 points (6.8% of efficiency). This is the objective of next section. But first 
note that the standard deviations of observed scores which reflect the inequity of our educational system are 
quite higher than the standard deviations of “ideal scores”. In other words, if Belgium could end up on the best 
practice frontier, its educational system would turn more equitable.  
 
  Table 5. Average efficiency scores (mathematics, reading and science) 
 
Community Observed Frontier Distance to the frontier 
Average 
efficiency 
Flemish 538.3 (88.5) 
634.5 
(39.9) 
96.2 
(57.8) 
84.4 % 
French 490.2 (95.9) 
627.1 
(46.1) 
136.9 
(63.1) 77.6 % 
German 515.3 (90.4) 
637.7 
(33.6) 
122.4 
(66.6) 80.4 % 
Belgium 520.6 (93.8) 
632.5 
(41.6) 
111.8 
(63.3) 81.8 % 
Note: Standard deviations into brackets. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution on efficiency scores (on the horizontal axis) for the three Communities. The 
most efficient students with scores above 97.5 % are located on the extreme right. They comprise 55, 2 and 7 
individuals in the Flemish, French and German Communities respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33 
Figure 2. Efficiency scores distribution 
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4. Determinants of efficiency slacks 
As already mentioned our methodology allows us to calculate the efficiency of each student and to explain 
it. More explicitly we want to explain as much as possible the observed gaps with respect to the best practice 
frontier on the basis of selected variables. These variables have been introduced for the first time in PISA 
2006; they pertain to the selection policy of each school, its degree of autonomy, the qualification of its 
teaching staff. They have been introduced in our model along with variables related to the origin, the birth 
place of the student and that of his parents, the gender, a possible backwardness, the type of school (general 
or vocational ; private or public, Flemish, French or German).  
We are first interested by the regression coefficients, their sign and their degree of significance. They are 
given in Table 6.39 Allochtones do not do as well as autochtones and girls are outperformed by boys.  Being 
backward hurts efficiency as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
39 We estimated another model in which the community dummy variables, French and German, were crossed with other variables. However, out 
of some marginal variations the results presented in Table 6 were confirmed. 
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Table 6. Explanatory factors of students’ efficiency 
 
Variables 
Estimation Effect on efficiency 
Parameter (t-ratio) CFR-CFL CGE-CFL 
Student 
   Girl - 0.036 (0.005)*** - 0.1% - 0.1% 
   Born abroad 0.004 (0.008) - - 
   Mother born abroad - 0.020 (0.006)*** - 0.2% - 0.2% 
   Father born abroad - 0.038 (0.008)*** - 0.5% - 0.4% 
Scholar career     
  Without backwardness  Reference - - 
  Backward one year  - 0.106 (0.005)*** - 1.1% - 0.8% 
   Backward one year or + - 0.235 (0.012)*** - 0.8% - 0.9% 
School 
   Student selection 0.008 (0.004)* - 0.1% - 0.1% 
   Autonomy - 0.003 (0.005) - - 
   Teachers’ qualification 0.011 (0.015) - - 
   Share of girls 0.009 (0.009) - - 
Type of education 
   General Reference   
   Technical and artistic - 0.092 (0.006)*** 0.7% 0.8% 
   Professional - 0.243 (0.008)*** 0.4% 0.4% 
Authority 
   Public Reference   
   Private 0.017 (0.006)*** - 0.1% - 0.3% 
Community 
   Flemish Reference   
   French - 0.090 (0.006)*** - 5.1% - 
   German - 0.051 (0.009)*** - - 2.6% 
Intercept (Reference) 0.241 (0.020)***   
Total effect on efficiency   - 6.8% - 4.0% 
Notes: The parameters are estimated simultaneously with distance function parameters. The 
reference category corresponds to the intercept.  
***, **, and  *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Number of observations: 8595. 
 
As to the main characteristics of schools, a selection policy fosters performance but with rather low 
significance (only 10%). Autonomy, skill of teachers and the gender ratio have no significant effects. Private 
schools do better than public schools and the students of vocational schools (TAP) have lower scores than 
the others. 
Finally, unexplained performance slacks between the communities remain. The dummies “French 
Community” and “German Community” are associated with negative effects that are significant. Namely, 
most of the difference between the Flemish and the French Communities cannot be explained. 
The last columns of Table 6 presents a decomposition of the efficiency gap between the Flemish 
Community on the one hand and the French and German Communities on the other hand. This gap 
amounts respectively to 6.8% and 4.0%.40 Of that gap the above explanatory variables only explain 1.7% and 
1.2%, which means that the dummy “Community” explains most of the gap. 
                                                
40 These effects are estimated taking into account the observed differences across communities for each characteristic. 
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In the comparison between the two Communities, some variables increase the efficiency gap and others 
diminish it. For example, schooling backwardness and father’s origin are variables that contribute to reduce 
the gap while the choice of options increases it. 
 
5. Conclusions  
Trying to explain the differences in performance among Belgian schools is a difficult and risky endeavor. One 
cannot avoid being struck by the gap in average performance between the Flemish and the French 
Communities. Most of this gap remains when some variables such as private/public, nationality, 
vocational/general are introduced. It is then tempting to construct variables that contribute to reduce the gap 
but that basically reflect the dichotomy Flemish/Walloon. We do not want to resort to this statistical trick. One 
is then left with the key question: what makes Flemish schools perform better than French speaking schools? 
The two regions are different in many respects: their language to start with, the rate of unemployment, the 
cultural life, the growth rate, the values and the expectations, the political leanings. The Flemish seems to be 
more dynamic and optimistic, more conservative and trusting the market than the Walloon. Can these and 
other characteristics explain the educational performance gap? Quite probably but we are here outside of the 
expertise of economists. 
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Examining the educational gap between 
Flemish and French-speaking schools 
 
Jean Hindriks (UCLouvain & Itinera Institute) 
Marijn Verschelde (Universiteit Gent) 
 
 
 
The contribution of Professor Vandenberghe is very much welcome. Belgium is a special microcosm for 
education policies. Indeed there is wide variation in education achievement between the French-speaking and 
Flemish communities (and much wider variations across schools and across students). Flemish schools have 
been consistently at the top of the PISA tests in math, reading and science (for years 2000, 2003, 2006 and 
2009); whereas the French-speaking schools were below the average. The gap is large around 50% in terms of 
standard deviation (which is equivalent to one year of learning). Moreover this achievement gap is not recent 
and it seems to keep on growing.  
The natural question to raise is why is there a gap if we want to close this gap. Prof. Vandenberghe is giving 
elements to answer the question and we will complement this analysis with further important considerations 
arising from our recent work on the issue.   
 
Why is there a gap? 
 
Socio-economic difference: First the Flemish community is richer and parents are more educated. It is 
widely known that more educated parents get more educated children. For example, in a literature review 
published in the Journal of Economic Literature, Bob Haveman and Barbara Wolfe (1995) conclude that the 
education of parents is the most fundamental factor in explaining the child’s success in school. Is it nature or is 
it nurture? Is it because more able parents have more able children? Or is it because more educated parents 
have more resources - caused by their higher education - to provide a better environment for their children to 
do well in school? 
The intergenerational transmission of cognitive ability is now well documented, but it is hard to conceive that 
Flemish parents are more able on average and so transmit better cognitive ability to their children.  The fact is 
that we do not need to delve in this nurture/nature debate because the analysis of Vandenberghe shows clearly 
that we cannot resort to difference in the family socio-economic status to explain the achievement gap across 
communities. It is much more than that. Similar results have been obtained by Hindriks et al (2009), Hirtt 
(2008), and Perelman et al (2009).  
 
Migrants difference: The PISA 2006 sample reveals that there are three times more pupils with migrant status 
in the French-speaking schools than in the Flemish school (20% against 7%). It is also well known that non-
native pupils perform less at school.   This is well documented in Jacobs et al (2009) and Hindriks et al (2009). 
Recently the Minister of Flemish education reported that pupils with migrant status are three times more likely 
to lag behind. In 2008-2009, 41% non-native pupils are lagging behind in primary schools against 14% native 
pupils. For secondary education, these proportions are 69% for non-native against 27% for native pupils (Belga 
17/08/2010).  The fact that French-speaking schools have much more non-native pupils can explain lower 
achievements. However the key fact is that migration difference cannot explain the achievement gap, in the 
sense that pupils with the same migration background will on average perform better in the Flemish schools 
than in the French-speaking schools. Again there is more than that as already suggested in Hindriks et al 
(2009), Hirtt (2008), and Perelman et al (2009). 
 
 
School Autonomy difference: 
In Flanders, considerable school policy autonomy was entrusted with non-profit school groups ('de inrichtende 
macht') that can group several schools of the same type within the same city or region. (see also contribution of 
Frank Vandenbroucke in this volume). The studies of Eurydice (2007, 2008), a EU network that provides 
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information on and offer analysis of European education systems and policies, provide insight in the structure 
of school autonomy in Belgian regions in an internationally comparable way. A key feature is the great 
difference in the degree of school autonomy between the French-speaking and the Flemish Communities. 
Neither schools, nor intermediate government institutions have the autonomy to set the salaries of teaching or 
non-teaching staff. Schools have no autonomy in setting the end goals, though full autonomy in the curricular 
content of optional subjects. Schools also have full autonomy over teaching methods, textbook choice, 
grouping of pupils, pupil assessment and the decision whether a pupil should resit a year or not. 
 
In line with Eurydice, the PISA 2006 data, summarized in Table 2, show that Flanders is characterized by 
considerable autonomy in staffing, budget issues, assessment and discipline of pupils and that most of this 
autonomy is entrusted with the principal and the teachers. To obtain insight in the overall school staff 
empowerment, we created the composite index “school staff empowerment" as the proportion of the following 
issues where the principal or teachers have responsibility on: (1) hiring teachers, (2) firing teachers, (3) course 
content, (4) courses offered, (5) student assessment, (6) student discipline, (7) budget formation, (8) budget 
allocation. We found that Flemish schools report much larger operational autonomy than French-speaking 
schools. 
 
Figure: Histogram of school staff empowerment in Flemish and French-speaking Communities 
 
Source: Hindriks and Verschelde (2010). 
 
Hindriks et al (2010) shows that school autonomy boosts educational performance when school autonomy is 
defined as the operational empowerment of the principals and teachers. The analysis is carried out within the 
Flemish secondary school system in Belgium as it is has a long history of educational school autonomy, but 
considerable variation between schools in school staff empowerment. Combining detailed school level and 
pupil level data from the PISA 2006 study with a semiparametric hierarchical model, there are strong 
indications that operational school autonomy is associated with high educational performance if an 
appropriate accountability system is in place. Sensitivity tests show that both low and high-performing pupils 
benefit from this kind of school autonomy. 
 
The larger operational autonomy of the Flemish schools is also associated with a finely and densely defined set 
of learning targets (see also Frank Vandenbroucke in the same Volume). This is nicely illustrated in the 
following statistical survey of educational objectives in the Flemish and the French-speaking communities. 
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The table suggests clearly a better and finer definition of the learning’s objectives in the Flemish educational 
system both in primary and secondary schools.  
 
 
Source: N. Hirtt (2008) 
 
The missing link: school identity 
 
Vandenberghe shows that difference in educational returns cannot explain difference in schooling. His analysis 
reveals the striking result that returns to education are higher in the French-speaking community than in the 
Flemish community, which is exactly the opposite of what standard economic analysis would suggest. To get a 
better grasp of this outcome, just ask why do girls perform better than boys at school? This cannot be due to 
better salary prospects since they are paid less and are more likely to work part time. Pursuing this analogy with 
gender difference is in fact intriguing because we cannot attribute such difference to family background or 
migration status. We cannot attribute such gender difference to school difference neither (because they attend 
same schools) and lastly we cannot claim gender difference in cognitive ability. So there is something else as 
for the community difference. Something less visible and obvious but still very important. What could it be? 
 
Tastes vary with social context. This vision of tastes is important because norms are powerful sources of 
motivation. Norms affect fine-grain decisions of the moment. Norms drive life-changing decisions as well: on 
matters as important as whether to quit school, whether to go to the university or go to work.  
 
When we examine people’s decisions from the perspective of their identities and social norms, we get new 
answers to many different economic questions. Who people are and how they think of themselves is key to the 
decisions that they make. Their identities and norms are basic motivations. This approach was coined “identity 
economics” by Akerlof and Kranton (2010). 
To grasp the relevance of identity economics, and how it differs from standard economics, consider the 
following puzzling fact. Men and women in the United States smoked cigarettes at vastly different rates at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, but these rates largely converged by the 1980’s. Women now smoke just as 
much as men. We cannot explain this convergence in terms of standard economic arguments, such as changes 
in relative prices and incomes, because no such changes were sufficiently large. But we can explain it if we ask 
how people think about themselves – that is, if we examine changes in gender norms. Women early in the 
twentieth century were not supposed to smoke; it was inappropriate behavior. By the 1970’s, however, 
advertising campaigns targeted “liberated” women, telling them that smoking was not only acceptable, but 
desirable. 
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This example is just the tip of the iceberg. Taking social norms seriously has consequences that pervade the 
economic system, and also our lives more generally. 
But with identity economics it all makes sense, and we gain an entirely new perspective on work and learning 
incentives. The most important determinant of whether an organization functions well is not the monetary 
incentive system, as standard economic models would imply, but whether its members identify with the 
organization and with their activities within it. If they do not, they will seek to game the incentive system, rather 
than to meet the organization’s goals. 
Likewise, good schooling occurs not as a result of monetary rewards and costs, but because students, parents, 
and teachers identify with their schools, and because that identification is associated with learning. Moreover, 
whether students identify with being in school becomes the major determinant of whether they stay or drop 
out. 
 
To illustrate the effect of parental implication, Rege et al (2007) have investigated the implications of parental 
job loss for children's educational attainments. Using Norwegian register data they have estimated how 
children’s school performance is affected by their parents’ job loss. Fathers’ job loss leads to a substantial 
decline in children’s graduation-year grade point average. The negative effect does not appear to be driven by a 
reduction in father’s income or an increase in parental divorce, or the trauma of relocating. In contrast, the 
mothers’ job loss leads to improved school performance! Such findings are consistent with sociological “role 
theories,” with mothers responding to job loss by allocating greater attention towards child rearing. 
 
Given this, education policy should look at what some successful programs have done to establish a school 
identity that motivates students and teachers to work according to a common purpose. If we focus on training 
teachers in how to inspire their students to identify with their school – rather than teaching students to take 
standardized tests – we just might be able to reproduce these schools’ great results. 
As economists and policymakers, we could be content to continue looking only at prices and income and 
related statistics to explain people’s decisions. In some circumstances, that might be enough to understand 
what is happening. But in many other situations, we would miss major sources of motivation – and thus would 
adopt useless, if not counter-productive, measures aimed at producing the outcomes we seek. Identity 
Economics provides the broader vision that we need. 
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Aspiration is the key for educational 
achievement 
 
Frank Vandenbroucke (University of Antwerp, KULeuven & Belgian 
Senate) 
 
 
 
Vandenberghe’s paper is a highly stimulating contribution to our debate. First of all, it contributes, albeit 
critically, to a proper understanding our country’s institutional problems as the result – or at least the corollary 
– of a complex set of vicious circles. Secondly, my reading of the evidence presented by Vandenberghe should 
also warn the Flemish side against complacency. Admittedly, that is my reading of this very interesting paper. 
 
It is well known that there are important correlations, at the level of individual people and/or households 
between (i) levels of education and levels of income (and labour market position), (ii) levels of education (and 
income) and health status, (iii) social, economic and cultural status of parents and their children’s educational 
achievements, (iv) expectations concerning the return to investment on education and the motivation to invest 
effort in one’s own education… So, when in one region income is on average lower and unemployment 
higher, relative to the other region, it is no surprise that in the first region the average health status is worse and 
educational achievement is less, relative to the second region. Less educational achievement leads to lower 
future incomes and less future employment. And so you obtain vicious circles of (growing) differences in 
average income levels, unemployment levels, educational achievement and health status. Such vicious circles 
explain why, added to linguistic and cultural issues, the socio-economic divide has become so entrenched and 
is so crucial in our institutional debate. 
 
The question is, then, primo, whether such vicious circles are the only explanatory factors for interregional 
divergence in income levels, educational achievement, unemployment, etc., and secundo, even if they have 
explanatory power today, how they historically emerged. Vandenberghe’s contribution is interesting, because 
he destroys a number of simplistic stories about these vicious circles. His figures undermine deterministic and 
reductive hypotheses one might entertain concerning the link between “context” (budgetary context, socio-
economic context…) and “educational achievement”. To put it bluntly, neither the socio-economic 
background of students, nor the return on investment in human capital, nor the budgetary resources devoted 
to education can explain the interregional difference in educational achievement: either their impact is not 
sufficient for an explanation (or there is no differential impact at all), or their impact cannot historically explain 
the long term divergence in educational achievement between the French and the Flemish community. It is 
this long-term divergence which is most remarkable in Vandenberghe’s figures. 
 
What then is the explanation? Vandenberghe points to differences in governance. But here I have to take issue 
with him. How could a difference in governance in the 1950s and 1960s explain the emerging divergence in 
outcomes in the 1960s? At that time education was still a truly unified federal competence. For sure, after the 
de-federalization of education in 1989, the Flemish government opted for a (new) policy of autonomy both in 
the state and the non-state sector (with the much-debated creation of the ARGO, The Autonomous Council 
for the Official Flemish Community Education Network). Since then, the Flemish Minister of Education’s 
impact on the former “state” sector is as limited as his impact on the free, catholic sector. We have given 
schools a lot of autonomy, whilst guiding them, not with a system of central examinations, but with a rather 
dense set of “eindtermen” (achievement targets). But that policy change cannot explain what happened before 
1990. However, the underlying hypothesis in Vandenberghe’s presentation may be linked to differences in the 
relative weight of the state versus the non-state sectors in the two communities: the relative weight of the state 
versus the non-state sectors might explain why already in the 1950s, “on average” governance in the Dutch-
speaking community yielded more autonomy to schools than in the French-speaking community. 
Vandenberghe does not explicitly pursue this line of argument, and it would need more analysis to corroborate 
it. 
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My personal guess is that a different explanation has to be introduced, linked to socio-cultural factors, which I 
would like to summarize in one word: “aspiration”. Aspiration is crucial for success in education. I believe that 
that is so, both on the level of individuals and on the level of their local communities or even the broader 
society to which they belong. Maybe, one of the main drivers of educational achievement, first of all in the 
catholic colleges and the state athenea in Flanders in the 1950s, and then in the rapidly expanding Flemish 
higher education system in the 1960s, was the drive for emancipation of a community that considered itself at a 
disadvantage and for which more and better education was part of an attractive “new frontier”. I think that 
collective aspiration was a key to the rapid democratization of Flemish secondary and then tertiary education 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Admittedly, this is a speculative explanation, but it is supported by so many individual 
testimonies and school histories, that I believe it to be the crucial factor. 
 
Vandenberghe is right in pointing out the importance of governance for the effectiveness of schools, not just 
for the average performance of students, but also for implementing policies for real equality of opportunity. 
Investing more resources in schools with a disadvantaged population is part and parcel of policies for equality 
of opportunity, but will not guarantee results. That is the reason, why as a Minister for Education I launched a 
“Decathlon for Equality of Opportunity in Education”, with ten challenges. The first test in the Decathlon 
turned on differential funding. However, we repeated times and again that budgets are only a precondition for 
creating equal opportunities. What really counts is what happens in the classroom, in the school or the 
university. Mediocre teaching will not create equal opportunities, as we have often said. So the remaining tests 
in the Decathlon all revolve around the quality (implying issues of language, choice, parental involvement, 
governance and structure) of education.    
 
A fundamental issue, which is difficult to “organize”, let alone “legislate”, is the level of aspiration of learners 
and their families and the aspiration of teachers. Aspiration remains crucial. So, in my interpretation, 
Vandenberghe’s story may signal a warning to us, Flemish people. If, historically, the remarkable surge in 
educational achievement was the result of a drive for emancipation of a community that considered itself at a 
disadvantage but aspired for a “new frontier”, complacency with our current situation may be the biggest 
danger we face. Complacency may turn advantage slowly into disadvantage. Also for that reason, it was 
necessary – and still is necessary – to call for a real Decathlon in Flemish education. 
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Comparing performance of the Flemish 
and Francophone educational systems 
 
Dirk Jacobs (ULB) 
 
 
 
In his paper on interregional educational discrepancies in Belgium, Vandenberghe (2010), making use of the 
well known PISA data, correctly points out that, regardless of the average socio-economic status of their pupils, 
Flemish schools consistently perform better than Francophone schools. The higher average scores for PISA 
for the Flemish community compared to the Francophone community are therefore not merely the result of 
some elitist schools on the Flemish side outperforming elitist schools on the Francophone side. It is neither the 
effect of schools with pupils at-risk underperforming even more on Francophone side than on Flemish side. 
Indeed, every type of school - judged by the composition of the student population - scores better in the 
Flemish community than in the Francophone community. This finding reported by Vandenberghe (2010), 
entirely confirms our own analysis of the PISA-data for the King Baudouin Foundation (Jacobs et alii, 2009).  
 
In figure 1 we once again visualize the link between mean socio-economic status of the school 
population (X-axis) and the average score for mathematics (in PISA 2006) per school (Y-axis). The figure, 
however, not only shows that Flemish schools systematically outperform Francophone schools. It also shows 
that the relation between school composition and educational performance is almost linear on Francophone 
side but curvilinear on Flemish side. This is not without importance. 
 
From a certain threshold onwards an increase in mean socio-economic status of the school 
population has a much weaker effect on educational attainment in Flanders. More elitist schools (in terms of 
mean socio-economic status of the school population) show less increase in average educational attainment 
compared to middle class or mixed schools on Flemish side than on Francophone side. Furthermore, Flemish 
schools tend to be more concentrated in the right-upper quadrant of the figure, while Francophone schools 
are dispersed all along the regression line. This equally suggests that school segregation has a bigger impact on 
Francophone side than on Flemish side. Although it is too early to formulate a final interpretation on these 
tendencies, they do seem to provide indirect proof that the earlier start of regulation of school enrolment and 
targeted policies (aiming at equal opportunities) on Flemish side has started to pay off. This being said, there is 
nevertheless still a systematic difference between Flemish schools and Francophone schools. What could 
explain this difference? It can be shown, making use of the PIRLS-study, that there are more schools with 
economically disadvantaged pupils on Francophone side than on Flemish side (Mullis et alii, 2007: 250). This 
undoubtedly pulls the average Francophone achievement level down, but it does not help to explain why also 
schools with few economically disadvantaged pupils consistently score worse on Francophone side. PIRLS, by 
the way, also showed that the problem of pupil absenteeism is considerably higher on Francophone side than 
on Flemish side (Mullis et alii, 2007: 268), a potentially important explanatory factor which, however, 
necessitates more in-depth analysis distinguishing different types of schools. 
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Figure 1. Mean socio-economic status of school population and average mathematics scores per school 
 
 
 
 
In his lead paper, Vandenberghe (2010) argues that “hybrid governance” – the lack of a coherent governance 
framework -, caused by the presence of a fragmented educational policy landscape (which in turn is linked to 
the existence of several organisational networks) contributes to poor performance. There would be a bigger 
problem of “hybrid governance” on Francophone than on Flemish side. As the author himself, however, points 
out, organisational networks (leading to hybrid governance) also exist on Flemish side. Even though it is true 
that one catholic network dominates on Flemish side, one might wonder whether this really explains a 
differential degree of “hybrid governance”. Furthermore, does the level of “hybrid governance” constitute a 
sufficient explanation for the poorer overall results on Francophone side? If it does, it still needs to be shown 
what exact elements of “hybrid governance” lead to worse results. The causal chain is not clear. 
 
We have ourselves never taken up the challenge to explain the interregional educational 
discrepancies in Belgium. Let us note, however, that in our ULB-report for the King Baudouin Foundation 
(Jacobs et alii., 2009) we have stated that the explanations suggested by Hirtt (2008) seem to be plausible. He 
highlights the differential level of financial investment in the educational system – average amounts spent per 
pupil are substantially higher on Flemish side than on Francophone side. He furthermore points to the 
differences in precision of educational objectives – there are more elaborate “eindtermen” on Flemish side 
compared to more vague “socles de compétences” on Francophone side. Perhaps this is the missing link when 
discussing “hybrid governance”. There is more centralisation in goal setting and methods of evaluation on 
Flemish side than on Francophone side. Educational objectives are more precisely defined on Flemish than 
on Francophone side, but we are not in a position to assess to what extent this is caused by the relative weight of 
different educational networks.  
 
Hindriks & Verschelde (2010) have claimed that a higher level of school autonomy and flexibility – 
measured through a composed index of variables linked to recruitment of staff, allocation of budgets and 
choice of textbooks – explain better outcomes. As Vandenberghe (2010) and Hindriks & Verschelde (2010) 
have pointed out, the score on the school autonomy index of PISA is higher on Flemish side than on 
Francophone side (and this is mainly due to lower autonomy of Francophone public schools). Consequently, 
Hindriks & Verschelde (2010) plead for more school autonomy on Francophone side. It should, however, be 
noted they do not see this in contradiction to the need for more centralised methods of evaluation (i.e. socles 
de competences and use of external evaluation). 
 
 I am not convinced that unconditional granting of more school autonomy (in staff recruitement and 
budget allocation) in itself is a good idea, as Hindriks & Verschelde (2010) seem to be suggesting. Indeed, I fully 
agree with Vandenberghe (2010) when he states that schools serving at-risk students should be enabled “to 
 45 
attract (or simply retain) better and more experienced teachers”. Enlarging school autonomy, however, will not 
necessarily lead to this effect. Competition for “better”, more motivated and more experienced teachers will 
then probably only increase and why would schools serving at-risk students win this competition if this policy is 
not accompanied by other measures? 
 
 Our multi-level analysis for the FRB-report (Jacobs et alii, 2009) has shown that, in both linguistic 
communities, the effect of the mean socio-economic status of the school population on educational 
attainment is substantially bigger than the effect of the socio-economic status of individual pupils. In our 
discussion of these results, we have argued that this should not necessarily be interpreted as a pure school 
composition effect or a so-called “peer-group effect”, i.e. the mutual influence pupils have on each other. 
Indeed, as Vandenberghe (2010) has also pointed out in his paper, schools who find themselves at the lower 
ends of both the average score for mathematics and the mean socio-economic status of the school population, 
have a particular characteristic. They tend to have a particular staff situation and a high turnover. School heads 
complain it is more difficult to attract and especially keep specialised and motivated staff. I wish to study this 
phenomenon more closely in the future, but it is hence plausible that this correlation of teacher characteristics 
with school composition leads to a spurious effect. If schools with a particular type of pupils tend to attract a 
particular type of teachers, the school population composition effect might be less related to a peer-group 
effect and should rather (or at least also) be understood in terms of differential levels of teacher turnover and 
teacher’s efficacy, i.e. the (degree of) belief or conviction of teachers that they can influence how well students 
learn, even those who may be difficult or unmotivated (Gibson & Dembo, 1984; Guskey & Passaro, 1994). Let 
us explicitly stress that efficacy is not a synonym for efficiency. It has, however, been shown by several scholars 
that once teacher’s collective efficacy beliefs are taken into account, effects of student characteristics on 
achievement are reduced in a substantial way (Newmann et alii, 1989; Bandura, 1993). The challenge is hence 
to boost teacher efficacy beliefs in schools catering to at-risk pupils. 
 
Enlarging school autonomy in attracting teachers does not seem to be a good option here, if schools 
with high numbers of at-risk pupils, have no additional advantages to offer to teachers. One should in such a 
scenario perhaps consider differential incentives (on the level of salaries or other benefits) to allow schools 
catering to at-risk pupils to attract the “best” teachers. I am aware that this is easier said than done. It will not be 
easy to introduce differential pay schemes in the educational system, while there is now a practice of fixed 
salaries regardless of the type of school one is teaching at. Furthermore, one would wish to curtail perverse 
effects of such a system, as it has to be evaluated precisely what is “a school catering to at-risk students” and one 
does not want to penalize schools which do a good job in moving at-risk students to the status of out-of-risk 
students either. Undoubtedly economists are better equipped to invent solutions to such challenges than a 
sociologist as myself.  
 
Unfortunately, the Francophone community of Belgium did not participate to the OECD Teaching 
and Learning International Survey (TALIS) which allows for international comparison of teacher 
characteristics, including teacher self-efficacy. Perhaps I failed to locate them, but I currently have no 
knowledge of other sources allowing for a systematic cross-regional comparison of the level of teacher efficacy 
in the two linguistic communities in Belgium. It is, by the way, a real pity that the Flemish and Francophone 
communities seldom participate jointly to major international educational studies as TIMMS, PIRLS and 
TALIS – PISA being luckily a notable exception. In my opinion this would be very useful as it would allow us to 
for instance assess whether the lower results for educational achievement on Francophone side are related to 
lower levels of teacher self-efficacy (the belief one can make a difference) compared to the Flemish 
community. If this is the case, the next question is to explain where these differences in efficacy beliefs come 
from (professional and societal status, salary level, career stability, external guidance, school climate, 
management style, etc.). I would not be astonished if the differences in precision of educational objectives – 
“eindtermen” and “socles de compétences” – have an impact here, which brings us again to the point of 
Vandenberghe with regard to the debate about “hybrid governance” and the plea by Hindriks & Verschelde for 
more school autonomy. According to the PIRLS study (Mullis et alii, 2007), 96% of Flemish schools compared 
to only 20% of Francophone schools use textbooks as a basis for reading instruction. As reading skills are better 
on Flemish than on Francophone side, this seems to be an element pointing to the need for more 
standardisation and less autonomy rather than the contrary. I have argued that with regard to staff recruitment 
we probably do not need more (unconditional) school autonomy either, but rather a targeted human resources 
strategy. 
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Let me conclude that it is no exaggeration to state that the challenges for the Belgian educational 
system(s) are immense. It is a comforting thought, however, that we know that it is not an utopian idea to be 
able to combine equal opportunities (i.e. the neutralization of the effect of socio-economic background on 
educational performance) with the goal of excellence. The PISA study shows that a country like Finland is able 
to achieve several goals at the same time: the Finnish pupils are among the best performers in the world (with a 
high average and a substantial proportion of pupils achieving the highest cognitive levels), the number of 
Finnish pupils not reaching minimum standards is fairly limited and the impact of socio-economic background 
on educational attainment is nowhere as low as in this Nordic country (Jacobs et alii, 2009). The Flemish 
community might be doing well in the ranking of educational attainment, but it scores very poorly as far as 
equal opportunities are concerned. The Francophone community has mediocre to poor results on both 
indicators. Although this is a very legitimate and important issue, let us not just focus on differences between 
the two educational systems, as the shared challenges of assuring equal opportunities and tackling school 
segregation are just as important. Undoubtedly we should then also start studying them in better and closer 
cooperation. 
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